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IN THE SUPREHE COURT OF THE 
STJI.TE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, Case No. 15400 
-vs-
GENE H. lvADMAN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged by Information with the Crime 
of Forcible Sexual Abuse, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOHER COURT 
The case was tried to the Honorable J. Duffy Palmer, 
who found appellant guilty as charged. At sentencing, Judge 
Palmer reduced the crime to a class A misdemeanor and placed 
appellant on probation. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the judgment of 
the court below. 
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STATEME!JT OF FACTS 
Sandra Painter, the ex-wife of appellant, testified 
that prior to separating from appellant on December 30, 1976 , 
she had been married to him for three years and that although 
no children were born of that union, her three children fror.~ 
a previous marriage - Monica (4), Shaun (5), and Lisa (7) _ 
lived with them (T.B). 
Ms. Painter testified that she had been an eyewitnes: 
to two incidents of child molestation by appellant in which he 
fondled the genitals of her daughter Lisa. The first instance 
occurred on or about November 2 8, 19 7 6, when Ms. Painter was 
driving the family home to Syracuse fror.t appellant 1 s sisters-
house in Ogden (T.9-10). Although appellant had driven to 
Ogden to pick up his wife and her children, Ms. Painter testi::oJ 
that she drove home because appellant had been drinking and th<-
Lisa and appellant sat in the rear seat of the Mazda wagon dm~ 
the ride while Shaun and Monica sat behind the rear seat (T.ll-:1 
As she drove along the freeway in Davis County, Ms. 
Painter looked in the rearview mirror and observed Lisa sittin: 
on apoellant' s lap and appellant 1 s hand inside the front of he: 
pants (T.l4). She stated the activity lasted less than fiR 
minutes (T.l5). Ms. Painter continued driving home and admiW' 
11 t about either inc:'-
1 
in court that she never confronted appe an 
before lodging a criminal complaint, stating that she had ~t 
-2-
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known how to handle the situation and she was scared of 
appellant (T.21,27,38). 
The second incident occurred on December 12, 1976, 
11hen ."1s. Painter looked through the slightly open bathroom 
door and saw appellant, who had been drinking, rubbing Lisa's 
genitals as she stood in the bathtub, while her younger sister 
Monica sat playing in the tub (T.l6,19,21). Ms. Painter observed 
the activi~y for three or four minutes (T.20). She testified 
that she heard appellant ask Lisa if it felt good; appellant 
subsequently placed Lisa on his lap where he spread her legs 
and continued to fondle her genitals and kiss her stomach for 
a minute or so (T.21). Ms. Painter stated she then went back 
to the kitchen and called everyone to supper (T.21). 
Ms. Painter further testified that on December 30, 
1976, she and appellant, who was very drunk, quarrelled. He 
took a shower and dressed only in his undershorts, spent a few 
minutes with Lisa in her bedroom (T.23-24). Appellant then left 
the home to go to a party at a friend's home, where he remained 
overnight (T.l44-145). That same evening, Ms. Painter and 
her three children moved from the home (T.22) and she and Lisa 
had their first conversation about the sexual fondling. Ms. 
Painter testified that she told Lisa that she knew what was 
going on and wanted Lisa to tell her about it (T.l27). Shortly 
-3-
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thereafter Ms. Painter filed for divorce and contacted the 
County Attorney's Office (T.25). 
On cross-examination, some confusion arose as to th( 
accuracy of the November 28 date as evidence was introduced 
which showed that on that date the family had gone to a movie 
and out to dinner (T.SB-61). Ms. Painter admitted that the 
incident could have occurred on the previous Sunday but was 
sure that it happened on a day when she and Pam, appellant's 
sister, had gone shopping and appellant had come to Ogden to 
pick her up and drive back to their home in Syracuse (T.60-6l 
Seven-year-old Lisa \'/adman Painter testified that 
the first episode occurred near Thanksgiving in their car as 
she and her family were taking Tara home (T.85). (Tara is 
appellant's daughter from a previous marriage (T.B)). She 
reported that as she sat next to appellant in the rear seat, 
he pulled down her pants and put his finger in her "pee-pee" 
(T.85-86). Later Lisa said that after thinking about that e': 
some more, she now believed that she was sitting on appellar,: 
lap, adding that he had not been drinking (T.lOS-107). 
Lisa also described the bathtub episode, testi~~ 
h · f · ;ns ;de of her as she and Monic' that appellant put ~s ~nger ~ ~ 
sat in the tub (T.88,115). She reported that during this t~ 
he asked her if she was "boy crazy" and then lifted Lisa 0': 
of the tub, placing a towel under Lisa as he sat her on his 
-4-
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In lap {T.89,ll6). Again he inserted his finger {T.ll7). 
her childish language Lisa made clear to the court that 
appellant's finger was not then-or-ever inserted into her 
rectum {T.ll9). She also reported no pain {T.ll6). 
Finally, Lisa described the third occasion of 
sexual encounter with appellant. She testified that one 
night appellant entered her bedroom where Lisa stroked his 
penis {"pee-pee") until "something cane out" and appellant 
again inserted his finger in her vagina {T.88,120). 
Dr. Daniel Bergman testified that he examined Lisa 
on January ll, 1977, and found no evidence of any trauma to 
the vaginal or rectal areas, nor to the legs or lower abdmne-n·-
{T.72), noting that vaginal insection could have been only 
one-half to one centimeter, as deeper penetration would have 
damaged the hymen {T.73,77). Finally, he reported that rectal 
insertion would have caused Lisa pain and discomfort {T.77). 
Appellant testified on his own behalf, denying all 
charges {T.l90,195,196), stating that Lisa must have been told 
to lie about him {T.l98) and blaming the entire affair on Ms. 
Painter's vindictiveness over their marriage break-up, a 
bitterness he claimed was supported by the letter entered as 
Defendant's Exhibit No. 1 {T.l97). 
-5-
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ARGUtiE~lT 
POINT I 
AS THE BILL OF PARTICULARS GAVE ONLY AN APPROXIl1ATE 
DATE FOR THE COJV'.J1ISSION OF THE FIRST MOLESTATION, AND THE 
DATE WAS NOT CRUCIAL TO THE OCCURRANCE OF THE EVENT, THE 
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE TESTIMONY WHICH 
RELATED THE EVENT TO A DIFFERENT DATE. 
The original Bill of Particulars, dated April 28, 
1977, included the following information about the first 
allegation: 
"3. A. The first incident occurred on 
or about November 29, 1976, at approximate 
(sic) 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. in a car while in 
transit from Ogden, Utah, to Syracuse, Utah. 
4. A. Incident #1: Those present were 
Sandra Nadman, Lisa \•Jadman, Monica Painter, 
Shaun Painter, and the defendant. 
5. A. Incident #l: It is alleged that 
the defendant, while in the back seat of 
the family stationwagon, did fondle the 
genital area of Lisa Wadman." (R.l2-13) 
The Amended Bill of Particulars, dated June 13, 
1977 (R.lB-19), changed the date of the first incident from 
on or about November 29, 1976, to on or about November 28, 
1976. Of both the 
Original and Amended From the language 
Bills, it is clear that the prosecution was ~ going to prol'e 
. d · ther November 
that the molestation necessarllY occurre on el 
Proximation, 28th or November 29th; rather the date was an ap 
-6-
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indicating that the incident occurred around the Thanksgiving 
holidays, although it may have actually happened a few days 
before or a few days after the date given in the Bill of 
Particulars. Therefore, the limiting factor is not when the 
incident occurred, but where; for the Bill states that the 
molestation definitely occurred in appellant's car while the 
family was in transit from Ogden to Syracuse. 
Given these circumstances, the prosecutor did not 
have to submit an Amended Bill as November 28 is "on or about 
November 29". Nevertheless, the state wanted to provide a 
date which seemed to be more likely than other dates, acknowledg-
ing by the language of approximation that the state would not 
and could not prove conclusively the date on which Allegation 
*1 occurred. 
If the allegation had been linked to an event which 
could have been proven to have occurred on a specific day i.e. 
arson, bank robbery or murder, then that date would be crucial 
and an alibi defense perhaps a perfect defense. Here, time was 
not of the essence of the crime and the changing of the 
approximated date in the Bill of Particulars violated none of 
appellant's constitutional rights. In an analogous situation, 
the court in state v. Rohletter, 108 Utah 452, 106 P.2d 963 
(1945) held that under Utah Code Ann. § 105-17-3 (1943) (now 
-7-
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§ 77-17-3) no amendment could be made which would essentially 
alter the nature of the case. So as to prejudice the defendanc 
in making his defense. Here, although it was the Bill of 
Particulars which was amended and not the Information, the 
principle is the same; for amendments and deviations are 
allowed when they are mere changes in form but not substance. 
Appellant's defense was that he did not commit the crimes, 
although a notice of alibi prompted the changing of the da~ 
of Allegation #1. That denial defense would be the same on 
whatever day was established as the date he sat in the rear 
I 
seat with Lisa on the drive from Ogden to Syracuse. Therefore,~ 
appellant suffered no prejudice when the court allowed evidence·[ 
to come in that related to a different, non-specific day. 
The private nature of sexual abuse crimes often 
present difficulty in attempting to determine and prove their 
exact dates of commission. The general allegation of the Infor-
mation against appellant, excerpted below and attached hereto, 
reveals the wide span of time which covered the three incident' 
and by implication acknowledges that specific times for all of 
them might be unknown: 
.From November, 1976, until 
December, 1976, at Syracuse ... the above-
named defendant did ... touch the anus 
or any part of the genitals of another, 
-8-
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Lisa Painter, or otherwise take indecent 
liberties with her or cause her to take 
indecent liberties with himself with 
intent to arouse or gratify the
1
sexual 
desire of any person, without the consent 
of the other." 
It is noteworthy that after the Bill of Particulars 
was amended no new alibi defense was raised. The instant 
case is, therefore, similar to State v. Mecham, 23 Utah 2d 18, 
456 P.2d 156, 157-158 (1969) where appellant was convicted of 
indecent assault against an eleven-year-old girl. The court 
made the following pertinent observations in upholding his con-
viction for the crime which was alleged to have occurred on 
Friday, August 2, 1968: 
"In support of his attack upon that 
finding, defendant places his reliance 
upon his denial and the fact that there 
was evidence from his wife, his 18-year-
old son, his 17-year-old foster daughter, 
and a 13-year-old neighbor boy, which 
would tend to indicate that the defendant 
was around his home and in the presence 
of one or more of them during the after-
noon of August 2nd and, thus, could not 
have committed the offense. It is note-
worthy that the exact date of the offense 
was never made a particular issue at the 
trial by notice of alibi or otherw~se, 
except as the witnesses were quest~oned 
as to what happened on that date, " 
That case also was tried without a jury and the court cited 
comments by the trial judge which while acknowledging possible 
mistake in the August 2nd date, nevertheless provided a basis 
-9-
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for his judgment against appellant: 
"I think the little airl was 
telling the truth. The e;ent may 
not have occurred on the 2nd day of 
August, but on some date very close 
to that time." 
In the case at bar, appellant may well have prov~ 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the molestation did not occur 
on November 2 8. However, he admitted that he and his family 
had made numerous visits to Ogden, where Tara lived, and 
that on some occasions he had picked up his wife there to 
drive her home (T.l85), and he could not deny that the particub 
trip in question from his sister's home to his had occurred 
(T.l99). He also admitted that on one occasion he had ridden 
in the back seat while his wife drove home (T.l84-185). There- I 
fore, the heart of the state's case concerning Allegation #1 ) 
was Lisa's testimony about the incident which she admitted 
occurred near Thanksgiving (T. 85). Thanksgiving was November 
25 (T. 53) and "on or about November 29" would include a date 
defined as "about Thanksgiving:" 
Under this analysis, appellant's argument that the 
incident occurred outside the parameters of the Bill of 
Particulars is flawed. Time was not of the essence of the 
crime and the state proved to the satisfaction of the trial i·;':' 
-10-
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that on one of the Syracuse-Ogden-Syracuse trips, near Thanks-
giving, appellant beyond a reasonable doubt fondled the 
genitals of his seven-year-old step-daughter. That finding 
is enough to sustain the verdict, and even if the actual 
date of the incident is still undetermined, affirmation is 
in order, for every element of the offense was proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt and the establishment of a particular date 
for Incident #1 related only to evidentiary matters and 
potential problems of proof. Because appellant's defense 
suffered no detriment or prejudice, relying on denial and 
testimony of friends, and the Bill of Particulars fully 
harmonized with the Information and provided adequate_ info_r_-__ _ 
mation about the incidents so as to enable appellant to 
understand the nature of the charges against him and prepare 
a defense, respondent urges this court to reject appellant's 
argument. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT. 
The principles governing the standard of review for 
appeals based on allegations of insufficient evidence have 
been published and affirmed numerous times. A succinct state-
ment of those principles appears in State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 
34, 39, 347 P.2d 865 (1959): 
-11-
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. "The rules governing the scope of 
rev1ew on.appeal as to the sufficiency 
of the ev1dence to sustain the verdict 
are well settled: that it is the pre-
rogative of the jury to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses and to 
determine the facts; that the evidence 
will be reviewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict; and that 
if when so viewed it appears that 
the jury acting fairly and reasonably 
could find the defendant guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the verdict will 
not be disturbed." 
In the instant case the appellant waived a jury 
trial and the district judge became the sole trier of fact. 
However, the same standard of review applies to his findings 
and his judgment and except for compelling reasons, his 
findings will not be disturbed. 
Cannon v. Wright, 531 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1975), is 
particularly helpful for there the court held that it is the 
prerogative of the trial court to determine what aspects cl 
the evidence he will believe and that in so doing, the tr~l 
judge may be selective, choosing those portions of the t~t~ 
mony of any witness which he thinks has the greater probabiJ!·. 
of being true. 
In the same vein is the earlier case of DeVas v. 
Noble, 13 utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d 290 (1962), cert. denied 83 
s.Ct. 37, 371 u.s. 821, where the court found that due to the 
function of the trial judge as determiner of facts and his 
-12-
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advantaged position in close proximity to witnesses and 
trial, it is his privilege to be the exclusive judge of 
credibility of witnesses, weight to be given the evidence, 
and findings to be found therefrom. Respondent submits that 
these holidays govern the case at bar. 
In his brief, appellant argues that neither Ms. 
Painter nor Lisa Wadman Painter were believable because Ms. 
Painter was vindictive, bent on revenge against appellant, who 
had left her; and Lisa was being controlled by her mother, on 
occasion changing her testimony, giving testimony inconsistent 
with her mother's, and making statements about appellant's 
digital insertion which were likely untrue. Respondent's 
position is that the trial judge carefully considered these 
factors in drawing his conclusions, and that because some of 
appellant's allegations are true, the judgment of guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt is even more strongly supported and soundly 
based. 
Lisa Wadman Painter did give testimony inconsistent 
with her mother's, acknowledged in respondent's Statement of 
Facts and detailed at page ten of Appellant's Brief. These 
inconsistencies actually make her testimony more believable, 
rebutting appellant's subtle allegation that Lisa and her ·mother 
were in collusion to decieve the court. Specifically, the 
-13-
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following excerpts from Lisa's testimony reflect the frankneso 
of her answers to sometimes difficult questions during length: 
direct and cross examinations. Respondent submits that the 
trial court reasonably was persuaded by her testimony that 
this seven-year-old little girl was being subjectively tru~t 
even if she was unclear on some matters, and that her credibi:, 
being established, her testimony was deserving of great weigh: 
Mr. Gennerson first got assurances from Lisa that 
she would tell the "'hole truth (T. 8 4) . He subsequently asked 
Lisa if either he or Ms. Painter had told her what to say m• 
change her story and Lisa replied that they had not (T. 90-911 
When asked why she had changed her testimony about her sittin-
on appellant's lap in the car and not next to him she ans1;en 
it? 
sure 
"A. Because I wasn't sure that time. 
Q. Are you sure now. 
A. Yes. 
Q. \mat happened to make you get sure? 
A. I thinked. 
Q. Who? 
A. I thinked. 
You thinked, you have been thinking about 
gid somebody talk to you to ask you to be 
if you wasn't sitting on his lap then? 
A. No. 11 (T.l05) 
-14-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
On the matter of the digital insertion, Lisa 
initially said that she couldn't remember how far into her 
appellant pushed his finger, stating only that it didn't 
hurt (T.90,108). Later Hr. Sharp stated to her that when 
they had talked before trial she had said that appellant had 
inserted his finger about "this far" (holding his fingers 
spread 1 1/4 to 2 inches) and asked if that was right. Lisa 
replied, "Yes." (T.ll6). Although Dr. Bergman did refute 
her last response (T.73), respondent submits that her third 
response, inconsistent with her first two, was likely a 
response to Mr. Sharp's suggestion of that depth, and that 
her earlier testimony on the subject was more credible, t~~~~-~ 
questions having been non-suggestive. 
An exchange which rebuts the insinuation of 
callusion occurred at T.llS-116, during cross-examination: 
"Q. . .Were you standing up in 
the tub or were you sitting down, where 
were you? 
A. Sitting down. 
* * * 
Q. Now is that something you 
remember pretty well? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You are sure you were sitting 
in the tub; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
* * * 
-15-
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Q. Now, if your mo~y testified. 
in here earlier today that she saw Gene 
playing with your pee-pee when you were 
standing up in the tub, I guess that's 
wrong, is that right? 
A. But I was sitting down." 
Respondent submits that taken as a whole and 
exemplified by these excerpts, Lisa's testimony merited the 
great weight the trial judge gave it, revealed in his com-
ments at sentencing: 
"I was persuaded by this little 
girl even to the point she corrected 
counsel when they would make statements 
in examining that she felt were not 
true. I was impressed with her 
frankness." (T.224) 
Respondent does not rely upon the testimony of Ms. 
Painter, acknowledging that the trial judge did not find 
persuasive (T.224), but refusing to speculate upon his reason' 
for so finding. However, based upon Lisa's testimony, and~ 
of other witnesses and appellant himself, giving each the duE 
credibility, the trial judge decided the facts of the case 
and found appellant to be guilty as charged. He had no reasc 
able doubts: 
"Mr. Wadman, if I had to sit and 
listen to what I had to listen to the 
other day, if I had to listen to it all 
over again, I would have to give the 
same decision." (T.224) 
Supported by the principles of ~, Cannon, and 
-16-
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DeVas, respondent requests this court to uphold the judgment 
of the court below. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the alleged incidents were proven to have 
occurred within the dates supplied in the Bill of Particulars, 
and the evidence amply supports the judgment, respondent urges 
the court to affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
-17-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
--------~~~~~~~THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
-----------------------------------------
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. INFORMATION 
GENE H. WADMAN I 
Defendant. 
------------------------------------------------------------
GENE H. WADMAN, having heretofore been duly com-
mitted by Cornell M. Jensen, a committing magistrate of this 
County to this Court, to answer this charge, is accused by . 
the County Attorney of Davis County, by this Information, of 
the crime of FORCIBLE SEXUAL ABUSE (76-5-404 UCA) , a felony 
of the third degree, as follows·: From November, 1976~- until 
December, 1976, at Syracuse, County of Davis, State of Utah, 
the above-named defendant did, under circumstances not-amount-
ing to rape or sodomy, or attempted rape or sodomy, touch 
the anus or any part of the genitals of another, Lisa Painter, 
or othe~rise take indecent liberties with her or cause her 
to take indecent liberties with himself, with intent to arouse 
or. gratify the sexual desire of any person, without the con-
sent of the other. 
MILTON J. HESS 
DAVIS COUNTY ATTORNEY 
ByA{,Jq~j_Qc 
Rodney s. ge 
Deputy county Attorney 
· wa1."ved by the defendant on the Preliminary hear1.ng was 
23rd day of March, 1977. The offense set forth in this Information carries a penalty 
· of a term of imprisonment of up to five years 
upon convict1.on 
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